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ABSTRACT
Many online social networks allow directed edges: Alice can uni-
laterally add an “edge” to Bob, typically indicating some kind of
interest in Bob, or in Bob’s content, without Bob necessarily recip-
rocating with an “add-back” edge that would have indicated Bob’s
interest in Alice. is signicantly aects the dynamics of inter-
actions in the social network. Most importantly, we observe the
rise of two distinctive classes of users, celebrities and follow spam-
mers, who accrue unreciprocated directed links in two dierent
directions: celebrities aract many unreciprocated incoming links,
and follow spammers create many unreciprocated outgoing links.
Identifying users in both of these two categories is an important
problem since a user’s status as a celebrity or as a follow spammer
is an important factor in abuse detection, user and content ranking,
privacy choices, and other social network features.
In this paper we develop SCRank, an iterative algorithm that
exploits a deep connection between these two categories, and clas-
sies both celebrities and follow spammers using purely the so-
cial graph structure. We analyze SCRank both theoretically and
experimentally. Our theoretical analysis shows that SCRank al-
ways decreases a potential function, and therefore converges to
an approximate equilibrium point. We then use experimental eval-
uation on a real global-scale social network and on synthetically
generated graphs to observe that the algorithm converges very
quickly, and consistently to the same solution. Using synthetic
data with built-in ground truth, we also experimentally show that
the algorithm provides a good approximation to the built-in set of
celebrities and spammers. Finally, we generalize our convergence
proof to a general class of “scoring” algorithms, and prove that
under mild conditions, algorithms in this class minimize a (non-
trivial) potential function and therefore converge. We give several
examples to demonstrate the versatility of this general framework
and usefulness of our techniques in proving theoretical results on
the convergence of iterative algorithms.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online social networks can be divided into two categories: undi-
rected networks such as LinkedIn or (pre-2011) Facebook that re-
quire the consent of both endpoints in order to establish an edge,
and directed ones such as Twier, Google+, and Flickr, that allow
one user to unilaterally create a directed edge to another, such as by
“following” the laer’s public updates, without the laer creating a
reciprocal (anti-parallel) edge to the former. As has been observed
in practice [12], this simple distinction signicantly aects the dy-
namics of relationships in the system: undirected social networks
like Facebook tend to cultivate socializing with friends, while di-
rected networks like Twier, interacting with content produced by
strangers constitutes a signicant portion of social interactions. In
the laer case, there are oen a few individuals who collect many
incoming links, either because they are already famous outside the
social network, or because they contribute exceptionally engaging,
viral content to the social network’s ecosystem. ese individuals
are in a sense the “celebrities” of the network. On the other hand,
we have nodes who accumulate many outgoing links to random
strangers. We call these nodes “(follow) spammers”. As we explain
below, identifying celebrities and spammers of a network are inter-
twined problems. is paper focuses on developing algorithms to
identify users in these two classes.
e simplest approach to identify a spammer is to count the
number of unreciprocated outgoing edges of each node and classify
the node as a spammer if this number exceeds a threshold. e
problem with this approach is that oen a non-negligible number
of regular users follow many celebrities, and this approach can
identify such users as spammers. Similarly, classifying celebrities
by counting the number of unreciprocated incoming links suers
from the problem that it can classify regular users who are targeted
by many spammers (for example, by the virtue of having their name
mentioned in a public, crawlable space) as celebrities. Instead, we
focus on this recursive denition of celebrities and spammers:
• A celebrity is a node who is followed by many non-spammers.
• A spammer is a node who follows many non-celebrities.
is recursive denition hints at a natural iterative approach for
nding celebrities and spammers. In the next section, we mathe-
matically formulate the problem and the iterative algorithm, which
we call SCRank. We then analyze the convergence properties of
SCRank, both theoretically and experimentally, and argue that its
output provides useful information. We will use a real-world data
set from LiveJournal, as well as randomly generated data, to exper-
imentally evalute the convergence properties of our algorithm. To
evaluate the output of our algorithm, we use randomly generated
data with built in ground-truth, and show that the algorithm can
recover a signicant portion of the ground truth eciently and
accurately.
Finally, in Section 5, we give a generalization of our potential
function argument to a more general framework of scoring prob-
lems, and prove that for any scoring problem satisfying a mild
symmetry and monotonicity assumption, a (non-trivial) potential
function can be associated with the natural iterative algorithm for
the problem, and therefore the iterative algorithm provably con-
verges. We give three concrete examples of this general framework
to demonstrate the versatility of our framework.
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1.1 Related work
Various measures of an individual’s standing in a social network
has been the subject of much research in sociology and social com-
puting, starting well before the dawn of online social networks.
Among the two axes we study, celebrities and follow spammers,
the lion’s share of the prior work on social graph structure has
focused on celebrities, typically with a goal of understanding and
algorithmically locating highly inuential people for the purposes
of ranking, marketing, predicting cascades, etc. [7], [2], and many
other early sociometric studies focused on dening and evaluating
social centrality metrics. In the digital age, algorithms for selecting
high-inuence sets of social network users from the social graph
structure were pioneered by [9], followed by a large literature of its
own. Much of the search engine literature focuses on nding inu-
ential nodes on the web graph, with the results on PageRank [13]
and HITS [10] forming perhaps the most inuential nodes in the
citation network. ese and related techniques have been borrowed
for social network applications as well, such as by [18]. While much
of this work has focused on the relatively more sophisticated notion
of inuence, as measured by impact on viral cascades, less aention
has been paid to questioning the idea that a high in-degree deter-
mines a user’s “celebrity” status. For the corresponding problem
on the Web graph, [16] notably gave experimental evidence that
corporate websites’ in-degree is a beer predictor of a company’s
prominence and worth than PageRank.
e follow spam problem has been recognized for several years
now [3, 8], but most of the existing work that does consider the
structure of the social graph still focuses on holistic machine-
learning approaches that combine graph properties with a many
signals derived from user content [1, 15, 17] — a very pragmatic
approach for detecting existing spamming activity, but of limited
utility in the common case where creating sibyl accounts is cheap
[19], and most abuser accounts are thus young.
e existing approaches also assign some form of “trust” seman-
tics to each directed edge, typically making it dicult to cope with
“social capitalists” [8]: the many legitimately popular celebrities
such as Barack Obama or Lady Gaga who have been observed to
reciprocate follow edges indiscriminately. Even when such indis-
criminate behavior is fairly common, SCRank is unaected, since
it entirely ignores reciprocated edges, and requires only a fraction
of users to be discerning about follow-backs to get enough input
signals.
e potential function that makes our analysis work combines
the potential functions of potential games [11] and Max-Cut games
[4]. e form of the SCRank algorithm itself is inspired various
iterative numerical algorithms used in machine learning such as
EM and belief propagation [14], and more directly by the HITS [10]
algorithm for web ranking. e dierences between SCRank and
HITS are subtle, but vital to understanding the operation and anal-
ysis behind SCRank, so we now address this specic relationship.
1.2 SCRank vs HITS
At rst blush, our reciprocal denition of spammers and celebrities
in terms of one another appears parallel to the denitions of hubs
and authorities in HITS. But mathematically, the structures are
quite dierent. HITS is expressible as a linear transformation of
either the original hub or authority vector, which converges by the
Perron-Frobenius theorem to the (positive real) principal eigenvec-
tor of a matrix based on the original graph. ere are two properties
that set the spammer-celebrity iteration apart from HITS. First, the
core update step of the spammer-celebrity iteration involves an
ane transformation rather than a linear transformation; such
transformations do not in general aain xed points. us, we use
the current spammer vector ®s to compute an intermedate celebrity
value ®c ′ = A(1 − ®s) via an ane transformation. Second, for rea-
sons we describe below, the particular update we seek requires an
elementwise modication to the results of the ane transforma-
tion by an arbitrary increasing function Fs . e new version of ®s
is given by ®s = Fs ( ®c ′). e actual transformation is therefore no
longer ane, but will in general be non-linear. Likewise, a similar
transformation applies to produce a new spammer vector from the
current celebrity vector. Combining both the ane transformation
and the non-linear modication, we have ®c = Fc
(
At (1 − ®s)) .
We now oer two words of intuition on the form of our up-
date. First, the ane structure comes about because, unlike HITS,
outliers on the celebrity scale provide no information about spam-
mers. On the contrary, only nodes that receive low scores on one
scale may provide signicant contributions to the score of nodes
on the other scale. A lile algebraic manipulation will convince
the reader that this property is fundamental to the nature of the
relationship between these classes, and cannot be overcome by
simple linear transformations of the variables, such as introducing
“non-spammer” scores or the like.
Second, the non-linear transfer function comes about for a re-
lated reason. e 1 − ®s term can be interpreted as a “non-spammer”
score if spammer scores lie in [0, 1], but in general if spammer scores
may grow large, the ane transformation will produce large nega-
tive non-spammer scores, which break the intuition that links from
spammers should not contribute one way or the other to celebrity
scores. us, scores must be scaled to remain in [0, 1] in order to
perform the iteration with the semantics we desire.
In general, the machinery we develop here is appropriate in
any situation that shows anti-reinforcing behavior: shady groups
fund dishonest politicians, while honest politicians are funded by
non-shady groups; and so forth.
2 THE ALGORITHM
To formalize an algorithm based on the recursive denition of
the celebrities and spammers in the previous section, we dene
a celebrity score cv and a spammer score sv for each node v . All
these scores are in [0, 1]. e algorithm is parameterized by two
increasing functions Fc and Fs that map non-negative reals to [0, 1].
We denote the directed social network by G , and the vertex set, the
edge set, and the number of vertices of G by V , E, and n. Also, the
set of unreciprocated directed edges of G is denoted by A. In other
words, A = {(u,v) : (u,v) ∈ E and (v,u) < E}.
e algorithm in presented in detail as Algorithm 1. We refer
to this algorithm as the SCRank algorithm, for Spammer-Celebrity
Rank. e algorithm is based on iterating the following two as-
signments until either an approximate xed point is found, or a
maximum number of iterations is reached:
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cv = Fc
©­«
∑
(u,v)∈A
(1 − su )ª®¬ sv = Fs ©­«
∑
(v,u)∈A
(1 − cu )ª®¬ (1)
Algorithm 1 (SCRank)
Input: Directed social network G; functions Fc and Fs ;
parameters ε and T
Output: Celebrity score cv and spammer score sv for each v ∈ V
1: for all v in V do
2: cv ← 0, sv ← 0
3: end for
4: k ← 0
5: repeat
6: for all v in V do
7: cnewv ← Fc (
∑
(u,v)∈A(1 − su ))
8: end for
9: for all v in V do
10: snewv ← Fs (
∑
(v,u)∈A(1 − cnewu ))
11: end for
12: δ ← max{| |c − cnew | |∞, | |s − snew | |∞}
13: c ← cnew
14: s ← snew
15: k ← k + 1
16: until δ < ε or k > T
For our experiments, we will use the CDF of a normal distribution
with mean µc and standard deviation σc as the function Fc . is
is essentially a so step function where µc controls the location of
the step (the threshold for the number of non-spammer followers
to count a user as a celebrity) and σc controls the smoothness of
this step function (a large σc means a smooth threshold at µc , while
a small σc we get a sharp threshold). Similarly, we use the CDF of
normal distribution with mean µs and standard deviation σs as Fs .
We note that our results go through even if the functions Fs and
Fc depend on the vertex v . is might be practically useful, for
example, by allowing the threshold µs to depend on the number
of reciprocated neighbors of the vertex (i.e., if a node has a large
number of reciprocated edges, allow it to have more unrecipro-
cated edges without counting it as a spammer). is and further
generalizations will be discussed in Section 5.
Our algorithm is similar in spirit to the Hubs and Authorities
algorithm of Kleinberg [10]. e major dierence is that in our
seing, the celebrity score of a node is related to the non-spammer
score of its followers. is negation makes a signicant dierence:
we need the spammer scores to be scaled in [0, 1] with 0 meaning a
non-spammer and 1 meaning a spammer (and similarly for celebri-
ties), whereas in the hubs and authorities algorithm it was enough
to compute scores that induce reasonable rankings. is, forces
us to use non-linear operators Fs and Fc . is is in contrast with
hubs and authorities, which uses linear operators and therefore can
characterize the scores as eigenvectors of a matrix.
Note on the implementation. In order to be able to use the SCRank
algorithm on graphs with hundreds of millions of nodes (as we do
in Section 4), we need to take advantage of parallel computation.
Fortunately, for the SCRank algorithm this is not hard to do, since
the celebrity scores in each iteration only depend on the spammer
scores last computed and vice versa. Using this, we implemented
each iteration of SCRank as two Map-Reduce stages, without any
blow-up in the size of the data in each iteration. is yielded a
very ecient implementation which easily accommodated even
our largest experiments in Section 4, on a social graph of over
400,000,000 nodes.
3 CONVERGENCE OF THE ALGORITHM
Ideally, we would like to show that: (1) when there is no bound T
on the number of iterations, SCRank converges to an (approximate)
xed point; (2) the xed point is unique; and (3) the algorithm
converges quickly to the xed point. In this section, we theoretically
show that (1) holds for all directed social networks. We will give
an example that shows that the xed point of the function is not
necessarily unique, much like in HITS and other similar algorithms
[6]. However, as we will discuss in the next section, we have not
observed such examples in real or randomly generated data sets.
Finally, we will experimentally show that the SCRank algorithm
oen converges very quickly.
We start by proving that the algorithm never falls into a loop.
is is done by showing that there is a potential function whose
value decreases in every iteration. e intuition behind this (complicated-
looking) potential function is that it combines the potential function
for max cut games [4] with those of potential games [11].
In the following theorem, we show the existence of this potential
function. We will then use this result to prove that the algorithm
converges to an approximate xed point of the Equations (1).
Theorem 3.1. For every directed social network G and every pair
of increasing dierentiable functions Fs and Fc , there is a function of
the the vector (c, s) computed by the SCRank algorithm that strictly
decreases in every iteration. erefore, the algorithm will never fall
in an innite loop.
Proof. Let Rc = Fc ([0,n]), i.e., Rc is the range of Fc when its
domain is [0,n]. Since Fc is increasing and dierentiable, its inverse
on Rc is a well dened strictly increasing function Fc−1. Next, we
dene the following function:
Gc (x) =
∫ x
0
F−1c (t)dt .
Similarly, using Fs , we can dene Rs and Gs . We are now ready
to dene our potential function. For any vector of celebrity and
spammer scores (c, s) ∈ R2n , the function P is dened as follows:
P(c, s) :=
∑
(u,v)∈A
(1 − su )(1 − cv ) +
∑
v ∈V
Gc (cv ) +
∑
v ∈V
Gs (sv ) (2)
Next, we show that the value of this potential function decreases
in every iteration of the algorithm. To do this, take the derivative
of P with respect to cv , for a vertex v :
∂P(c, s)
∂cv
= −
∑
u :(u,v)∈A
(1 − su ) + F−1c (cv )
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is derivative is zero when cv is equal to
c∗v := Fc (
∑
u :(u,v)∈A
(1 − su )),
negative when cv < c∗v , and positive when cv > c∗v . erefore, by
changing cv from its old value coldv to c∗v , the value of the potential
function can not increase. is means that the updates in line 7 of
Algorithm 1 never increase the value of P . In fact, since F−1c is a
strictly increasing function, if at least one of the cv ’s change, then
the potential function must strictly decrease. A similar argument
shows that the updates in line 10 of Algorithm 1 also do not increase
the value of P . is is enough to show that the algorithm never
falls into an innite loop. 
Next, we prove that the SCRank algorithm eventually converges
to an approximate xed point (also referred to as an approximate
equilibrium). Before stating the theorem, we need to dene the
notion of approximate xed point.
Denition 3.2. An ε-approximate xed point of Equations (1) is
a set of celebrity and spammer scores (cv , sv ) for each node such
that for each vertex v , we have
|cv − Fc (
∑
(u,v)∈A
(1 − su ))| ≤ ε
|sv − Fs (
∑
(v,u)∈A
(1 − cu ))| ≤ ε
(3)
Theorem 3.3. For every ε > 0, there is a nite number of iterations
aer which the vector (c, s) computed by the SCRank algorithm is an
ε-approximate xed point of Equations (1).
Proof. We use the notation from the proof of eorem 3.1.
Since Fc is increasing and dierentiable on a closed interval [0,n],
there is an absolute constant α , such that for every non-negative
x ∈ [0,n], the derivative of Fc at x is at most αc . is implies
that the derivative of the function F−1c on every point in Rc is at
least 1/αc . Similarly, we can dene αs for Fs and show that the
derivative of F−1s on Rs is at least 1/αs . Let α = max(αc ,αs ).
Next, we prove that if an update operation changes the values
by too much, it must also signicantly decrease the value of the
potential function. Assume in an iteration the value of cv is changed
from coldv to c∗v , where |coldv −c∗v | ≥ ε . Assume c∗v < coldv (the c∗v >
coldv case can be handled similarly). en for every x ∈ [c∗v , coldv ],
we have
F−1c (x) > F−1c (c∗v ) + (x − c∗v )/αc
=
∑
u :(u,v)∈A
(1 − su ) + (x − c∗v )/αc .
erefore, the derivative of the function P(c,v) with respect to
cv at cv = x is at least (x −c∗v )/αc . us, the value of P(c,v) at cv =
coldv is at least its value at cv = c∗v plus
∫ coldv
c∗v
(x − c∗v )/αcdx ≥ ε
2
2αc .
In other words, in each iteration where the value of at least one cv
changes by at least ε , the value of the potential function decreases
by at least ε2/(2αc ) ≥ ε2/(2α). Similarly, if the value of at least
one sv changes by at least ε , the potential function decreases by at
least ε2/(2αc ) ≥ ε2/(2α). Since the value of the potential function
Figure 1: Example with more than one xed point
decreases in every iteration and can never become negative, aer a
nite number of iterations it must decrease by an amount less than
ε2/(2α). is means that at this iteration, each score changes by at
most ε , showing that we are at an ε-approximate xed point. 
Uniqueness of the xed point. It would be nice if we could prove
that the xed point of Equations (1) is unique. is would mean
that the values that the SCRank algorithm seeks to compute are
uniquely well-dened. Unfortunately, this result is not true in the
worst-case, as the following example shows.
Proposition 1. ere is a directed social network D and functions
Fc and Fs such that more than one (c, s) satises the Equations (1).
Proof. Consider a regular bipartite graph with all the edges
directed from part 1 to part 2. Intuitively, this situation can be
explained by either declaring nodes in part 1 as spammers, or nodes
in part 2 as celebrities. For a numeric example, say the degrees are
500, µs = µc = 100, and σs = σc = 25. Let F = Fc = Fs . en
nodes in part 1 will have celebrity score F (0) ≈ 0 and spammer
score s , and nodes in part 2 will have celebrity score c and spammer
score F (0) ≈ 0, for values of (c, s) satisfying c = F (500(1 − s)) and
s = F (500(1−c)). ese equations are ploed in Figure 1. As can be
seen in the picture, there are 3 xed points with (c, s) approximately
equal to (1, 0), (0, 1), and (0.8, 0.8). e rst xed point corresponds
to declaring nodes in part 1 as spammers, the second corresponds to
declaring nodes in part 2 as celebrities, and the third is an unstable
xed point between the other two. 
Despite the above example, as we will see in the next section, in
none of the real world or randomly generated instances we have
tried we have been able to discover more than one solution.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the results of experiments showing that
on real and generated data, the algorithm presented in the last
section converges quickly and to the same point, independent of
the starting conguration. We also show that the computed scores
are reasonable quantications of celebritiness and spamminess in
the social networks. is is done with randomly generated data sets
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with a random generation process that embeds the ground truth
against which the output of the algorithm can be evaluated. For
experimentally evaluating convergence and uniqueness properties,
we use randomly generated data as well as two real-world data sets,
as described in the following.
4.1 Data Sets
We use two sources of data in our experiments. e rst is based
on real-world data from LiveJournal. e second is randomly gen-
erated data according to a model described below. Randomly gen-
erated data allows us to compare the results of the algorithm with
the “ground truth” that the model is based on. is is in contrast
with the real-world data set, which is used to evaluate the conver-
gence and uniqueness properties of the SCRank algorithm. As we
show, manually skimming the results on this data suggests that
the outputs are reasonable, but we do not have quantiable ground
truth.
In the rest of this section, we describe the random generation
process and basic information about our real-world data set.
e random generation process. We use the following method to
generate a random directed graph G that will be used as a test case
for our algorithm: ere are N nodes in the graph, out of which
two disjoint sets C and S are designated as the set of celebrities
and spammers. We then use a graph generation method such as
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi or preferential aachment to generate an undirected
graph H with the vertex setV (G). e edges of this graph represent
real friendship relationships among individuals. For each such edge
uv in H , with probability 1 − p we add both directed edges uv and
vu to G. With probability p, we add one of these two edges picked
at random. is represent the fact that even among the edges
corresponding to mutual friendship, some are not reciprocated.
In addition to these edges, we add random directed edges from
S to V (G) and from V (G) to C . We underscore that this models
spammers indiscriminately linking to some subset of all nodes,
including possibly celebrities and other spammers, and the converse
for inbound links to celebrities. For generating these edges, we use
a simple model of independent coin ips: for each pair (u,v) where
u ∈ S and v ∈ V (G), we add (u,v) independently with probability
ps . Similarly, for each (u,v) where u ∈ V (G) andv ∈ C , we add this
edge independently with probability pc . ere is no other edge in
the graph G.
e parameters of the model are as follows: N , |C |, |S |, p, pc , ps ,
and the parameters of the generation model for the graph H . e
algorithm is successful if it gives high cv scores to nodes in C (and
low cv to nodes in V (G) \C) and high sv scores to nodes in S (and
low sv to nodes in V (G) \ S).
For the experimental results we present in this paper, we have
picked the following set parameters: N = 2000000, |C | = 1000,
|S | = 5000, p = 0.2, pc = ps = 0.00025, and the graph H is a
random graph with expected degree distribution that is a power
law with exponent 0.5. e average degree in H is 100. ese
choices are mostly based on our intuition for typical numbers on a
social network. We have also tried the experiments on several other
sets of parameters, and did not observe any signicant change in
our conclusions.
LiveJournal Data Set. Each node in this data set is a LiveJournal
prole, and edges correspond to friendship relationships declared
on the proles. is data set is crawled, and contains more than
4.8 million vertices and 660 million edges. LiveJournal users may
choose to disallow crawling of their metadata via the robots.txt
mechanism. Any user who did so was not included in the crawl,
with all edges to and from this user removed from the data set.
4.2 Convergence speed
Let c and s denote the vector of cv ’s and sv ’s, respectively. We
can compute the `1 distance between the vector c computed at the
end of iteration t , and the one computed at the end of iteration
t + 1 (and similarly for s). When both of these values reach zero, it
means that the algorithm has converged to a solution. erefore,
we can use these values as a measure of the convergence of the
algorithm. We plot these values as a function of t for dierent
data sets and for dierent initializations of the scores, to see if and
how the initialization aects convergence speed. e results (in log
scale) for the three data sets are presented in Figure 2.
e initializations labelled init 0, init 1, and init 0.5 cor-
respond to initializing all scores to zero, all scores to one, and all
scores to 0.5. We also tried initializing each score to a random
number picked uniformly from [0, 1]; this initialization produced
results that were essentially indistinguishable from init 0.5 in all
data sets.1 As can be seen in the plots, dierent initializations do
not dier signicantly in terms of their convergence rate, although
init 0.5 oen performs marginally beer. In all cases, the con-
vergence seems to be exponentially fast (i.e., the log-scale plot has
an almost constant negative slope)
4.3 Uniqueness of the solution
To test whether the scores converge to a single point independent
of the starting point, we plot the l1 distance between the vector
computed by our algorithm starting from dierent initializations. In
particular, we measure the dierence between init 0 and init 1,
and between init 0 and init 0.5. e graphs, ploed as functions
of t in the log scale, are shown in Figure 3 for the LiveJournal and
randomly generated data sets.
As these graphs show, on the real-world data set aer less than
10 rounds, the solutions computed with dierent initializations are
virtually identical. In randomly generated instances, even though
the distance between the solutions decrease by about two orders
of magnitude in the rst ve iterations, they do not converge to
zero. is indicates that randomly generated instances probably
contains small pockets of nodes with non-unique solutions.
4.4 Solution quality
In this section, we argue that SCRank can recover a signicant por-
tion of celebrities and spammers. To show this experimentally, we
use randomly generated graphs with the setsC and S in the random
generation process as the hidden ground truth. e algorithm is
successful if it assigns high celebrity scores to nodes in C and high
spammer score to nodes in S . Figure 4 shows the distribution of
1Intuitively, this is due to the law of large numbers: for most nodes, they have enough
neighbors so that the sum of the non-celebrity/non-spammer scores of their neighbors
is essentially the same in init 0.5 and init rand.
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(a) LJ celebrity score (b) Synthetic graph celebrity score
(c) LJ spammer score (d) Synthetic graph spammer score
Figure 2: Log-scale l1 change in scores for LiveJournal and synthetic data, as a function of time
celebrity and spammer scores, comparing, respectively, all vertices
versus vertices in C ; and all vertices versus vertices in S . e score
distributions on these synthetic inputs are almost completely bi-
modal, with both celebrity and spammer scores of generic vertices
being strongly concentrated around zero. To beer observe the
dierence between the two distributions, we also show plots of the
distribution densities with logarithmic y-axes.
We can also study the precision-recall tradeo of the output of
the algorithm. We plot the precision of the algorithm (which we
dene as the percentage of users with celebrity/spammer score
more than 0.5 who are in C/S , respectively) against recall (dened
as the percentage of nodes inC/S for which we compute a celebrity
or spammer score, respectively, of more than 0.5). By adjusting the
parameters of the model, we get a tradeo between precision and
recall that is ploed in Figure 5.
5 GENERALIZATION
e potential function argument used in Section 3 to guarantee
SCRank’s convergence can be generalized to a much broader class
of iterative algorithms, which we expect will be of independent
interest. In particular, we will show that the same argument applies
to any iteration that simulates best-response dynamics in a game
where players have bounded real-valued strategies, and whose util-
ities are strictly monotic, continuously dierentiable per-variable
functions which depend only on a linear combination of the others’
strategies, with symmetric linear combination weights.
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(a) LJ: celebrity scores (b) Synthetic graph: celebrity scores
(c) LJ: spammer scores (d) Synthetic graph: spammer scores
Figure 3: Log of l1 dierence between scores computed with dierent initializations, as a function of time
Before we dene this formally, let us observe how this describes
the SCRank algorithm. SCRank uses 2n variables — two “players”
per SCRank agent. e convergence argument can be rephrased to
ignore the fact the variables are arranged in pairs in the original
setup. e updates in lines 6–11 of the algorithm are equivalent
to the ci players making best-response moves one at a time, then
the si players taking their turns. e utility/update functions for
the cv s and su s both depend only on a linear combination of other
variables: Fcv (L =
∑
u |(u,v)∈A −su ) = Fc (indegv+L), and similarly
for Fsu . For every (u,v) ∈ A, cv ’s update function input will include
su with weight −1, and su ’s update function input will include cv
with weight −1. is meets the “symmetricity” condition — that the
matrixW of variable weights in the update function inputs must be
symmetric. In SCRank,Wcv su =Wsucv = −1, and is 0 elsewhere.
Formally, we dene a general Monotonic U¨pdate on Symmetric
Linear combinations Iteration (MU¨SLI) system as:
• Real-valued variables x1, . . . ,xn with xi ∈ [ai ,bi ]
• A symmetric weight matrixW with 0s on the diagonal.
• For each variable, a strictly increasing, continously dier-
entiable update function Fi : R→ R which takes as input
only (Wx)i , the linear combination of the xi s weighted
by W ’s ith row. Fi must preserve the bounds on xi , i.e.
ai ≤ Fi ((W ®x)i ) ≤ bi whenever x j ∈ [aj ,bj ])
• An activation sequenceA : Z≥0 → {1, . . . ,n} determining,
for each iteration t ≥ 0, the unique variable xA(t ) that gets
updated to FA(t )((Wx)A(t )).
e proof of eorem 3.3 generalizes to show:
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(a) Linear-scale spammer scores
(b) Log-scale spammer scores
(c) Linear-scale celebrity scores
(d) Log-scale celebrity scores
Figure 4: Score distributions (p.d.f.)
Figure 5: Precision-recall graph for the detection of spam-
mers in a randomly generated data set.
Theorem 5.1. e state of a MU¨SLI system, ®x , converges to a xed
point under its iteration.
Proof. e argument is very similar, relying just on a general-
ization of the potential function. As above, the strictly increasing,
continuously dierentiable Fi s have well-dened strictly increasing
inverses F−1i , which lets us dene Gi (z) and the potential function
P(®x) as:
Gi (z) =
∫ z
0
F−1i (t)dt ; P(®x) =
∑
i
Gi (xi ) − 12 ®x
TW ®x
is yields the partials:
∂P
∂xi
= −(W ®x)i + F−1i (xi )
.
For x∗i = Fi ((W ®x)i ), this is zero, and, sinceWii = 0, the rst term
is constant relative to xi , and the monotonicity of F−1i guarantees
that updating xi to x∗i can’t increase P(®x).
As before, 0 < dFi (t )dt ≤ αi for some αi , and
dF −1i (t )
dt ≥ 1/αi .
An iteration that starts at state xold and updates xi from xoldi to,
WLOG, a lower value x∗i < x
old
i , changing it by x
old
i − x∗i ≥ ε , will
have, for all t ∈ [x∗i ,xoldi ]:
F−1i (t) > F−1i (x∗i ) + (t − x∗i )/αi
= (Wxold)i + (t − x∗i )/αi
∂P
∂xi
(xold−i , t) ≥ (t − x∗i )/αi
P(xold) − P(xold−i ,x∗i ) ≥
∫ x ∗i
x oldi
t − x∗i
αi
dt ≥ ε
2
2αi
Since ®x remains within the compact set dened by xi ∈ [ai ,bi ],
P(®x) is bounded, and, since it decreases at each step of the iteration,
there is, by the same argument as above, for any δ > 0, a step k∗
such that the update won’t change xi by more than
√
2αiδ . 
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Note that the proof doesn’t even require that each variable be
“activated” innitely oen, but we expect most practical uses of
this result will require that each xi be updated innitely oen for
convergence to a relevant value, or more oen than some threshold
for stronger convergence bounds.
To demonstrate the breadth of these systems, we now give a
couple of examples.
5.1 Example: Graph connectivity
As a trivial example of another algorithmic task solvable via a
MU¨SLI best-response iteration, consider the question of (undi-
rected) graph reachability. If the graph’s adjacency matrix is used as
weights, with nodes as players, using starting state 0 for all players
except the origin, iterating updates of sigmoid Fi (∑N (i) xi ) that
approximates a step function at x = 1 will clearly converge rapidly
to a state where all nodes reachable from the origin are 1.
5.2 Example: Inuence games
In SCRank and the above example, MU¨SLI systems are used as al-
gorithms to compute a xed point of interest. We note that the one-
at-a-time update dynamics and theWii = 0 constraint mean that
MU¨SLI iterations can also be interpreted as classical best-response
dynamics in games, immediately yielding:
Corollary 5.2. A game whose best-response dynamics form a
MU¨SLI system (i.e. an n-player game with bounded real-valued strate-
gies and strictly increasing, continuously dierentiable best-response
functions that depend only on a linear combination of the other play-
ers, with symmetric weights) is a potential game [11], with the above
potential function, and is guaranteed to converge.
is class of games is fairly broad, including, for instance:
e party aliation game. In the well-studied party aliation
game [5], agents pick “political parties” −1 and 1 based on the
weighted sum of their friends’ and enemies’ aliations: a player
tries to be in the same party as her friends and in a dierent
party than her enemies. Allowing fractional strategies and so-
ening the best-response function from the original step function
Fi (®x) = sgn ∑j xix jwi j to a sigmoid that approximates it produces
a game whose best-response dynamics are a MU¨SLI system. e
above argument guarantees a potential function and convergence.
We note that this is quite natural, since our potential function ar-
gument is an extension of the max cut game potential argument
that underlies the analysis of the party aliation game.
e symmetrical technology diusion game. Consider a social
network where agents are deciding, e.g., between 2 technologies
with a network eect such as cellular providers where a user bene-
ts from having more friends use the same technology. In the US
cellular market, this corresponds to free phone calls to people on
the same network, and heavy charges for calls to people on another
network beyond a xed monthly limit. Let weightWi j indicate how
many minutes i and j expect to talk on the phone per month, 0
and 1 represent the provider choices, and ®x ∈ [0, 1]n be the current
fractional provider choices, optionally considered as probabilities.
A natural best-response function for i is to use (W ®x)i , the expected
number of minutes she will spend talking to people using provider
1 (assuming minutes and provider choices are independent), as an
input to a sigmoid that is a so step function at or near the maxi-
mum number of free calling minutes for users of provider 0 when
calling users of provider 1. Assuming all phone calls are 2-way, the
best-response dynamics constitute a MU¨SLI system, immediately
demonstrating that the game is a potential game and guaranteeing
convergence.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a framework for iterative algorithms
for giving scores to nodes dened recursively in terms of the scores
of their neighbors, with a focus with one application in which such
a recursive denition comes quite naturally: computing celebrity
and spammer scores on a directed social network. We theoretically
proved that under a mild symmetry and monotonicity assump-
tion, there is a potential function that decreases in every iteration
of the iterative algorithm, and therefore, the iterative algorithm
always converges to an approximate equilibrium. In the case of
celebrity/spammer scoring, we experimentally showed that this
convergence is extremely fast, the convergence point is unique, and
when applied on randomly generated data with a built-in ground
truth, it provides a good approximation to the ground truth.
In addition to the obvious application of nding celebrities and
link-spammers in online directed social networks, we believe that
our potential function framework has the potential to be quite useful
in theoretical analysis of iterative algorithms on social networks.
Iterative algorithms such as belief propagation are notoriously hard
to analyze theoretically, despite widespread practical use.
e obvious open directions are to nd other applications or
generalizations of our framework, or prove a theoretical bound on
the convergence speed of the algorithm that is close to the practical
observation.
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